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Baby M and the Cassandra Problem*
GIRARDEAU A. SPANN**
Amid the controversy and animated analysis that surrounded the New
Jersey Supreme Court's issuance of the Baby M surrogate mother decision,' I
was frequently heard to grumble that the case was unimportant and rather
uninteresting-that it amounted to little more than the court's preference for
the doctor over the garbage collector in a child custody dispute. However, in
light of the sustained attention given the decision by my colleagues, I have
been forced to reassess my position, and I now find that the case does indeed
have a certain intrigue.
A fundamental tenet of judicial decisionmaking is that judicial decisions
should be based upon legal principles rather than the policy preferences of
the judges who issue them.2 In Baby M, however, the courts' opinions pro-
vide a particularly telling example of the ways in which our principles are
ultimately vulnerable to our preferences. Although we employ a variety of
analytical techniques in an effort to insulate judicial decisionmaking from the
subjective values of judges, these techniques never quite succeed. The Baby
M opinions illustrate this problem by relying on a series of analytical tech-
niques that themselves depend upon judicial value preferences to generate
outcomes. Thus, the opinions invite extrapolation from the analytical disap-
pointments of the courts' own reasoning to the very analytical system in
which that reasoning occurs. But no matter how fundamental the nature of
the problem appears to be, ultimately, we always resist the extrapolation. It
seems that those who would prophecy perpetual subjectivity are destined,
like Cassandra of Troy, never to be believed.3
Part I of this essay outlines the facts of the Baby M case and traces the
* Copyright 1988, Girardeau A. Spann.
** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Anita Allen,
Judy Areen, Richard Chused, Richard Diamond, Steve Goldberg, Pat King, Steve Salop, Mike
Seidman, and Mark Tushnet for their help in developing the ideas expressed in this essay.
1. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988), aff'g in part, rev'g in part, remanding 217
N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987). Hereinafter, the trial court decision will be cited as Baby M,
I and the New Jersey Supreme Court decision as Baby M, IL
2. The decision of the trial court in Baby M, I was explicit about this. The court stated:
Today, however, this court can only decide what is before it.... It will decide on legal
principles alone. This court must not manage morality or temper theology. Its charge is
to examine what law there is and apply it to the facts proven in this cause.
Baby M, Z 217 N.J. Super. at 334, 525 A.2d at 1138 (1987) (citation omitted).
Because judges are frequently unelected and typically insulated from political accountability, the
judiciary is generally viewed as i-suited to make policy choices. Politically accountable legislatures
are thought to be institutionally more competent to make social policy.
3. See infra text accompanying note 66.
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reasoning the New Jersey Supreme Court used to justify the legal conclusions
that it reached. Part II then identifies the three common analytical tech-
niques or modes of argument on which the state supreme court relied in
conducting its analysis and suggests that each is itself too dependent upon
unprincipled policy preferences to have excluded such preferences from the
decisionmaking process. Finally, Part III suggests that no matter how strong
an argument one might offer to demonstrate the systemic vulnerability of
principle to preference, the demonstration could never be convincing. Such
arguments are paradoxically self-defeating.
I. THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT'S REASONING
Baby M involved a surrogate-parenting agreement entered into between
William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead, both residents of New Jersey.
Prior to ruling on the enforceability of that agreement, the trial court recited
the following facts:4
William Stern was forty-one years old at the time of the trial and had a
Ph.D. in biochemistry. He had worked his way through school after the
death of his father, who was one of only two members of his family to escape
the Holocaust. Dr. Stem's wife, the daughter of a university professor, came
from a religious family in which education was highly valued. She met Dr.
Stern while earning her Ph.D. in genetics. She went on to earn an M.D. as
well, specializing in pediatrics. The Stems badly wanted children, but Mrs.
Stern 5 had incurable multiple sclerosis, which was thought to render her un-
able to conceive a child without incurring an unacceptable risk to her own
health.6
Mary Beth Whitehead was a twenty-nine-year-old mother of two children
and a high school drop-out who got married at the age of sixteen. Her thirty-
seven-year-old husband, a driver for a waste carting company, had a history
of alcoholism and had twice lost his driver's license as a result of drunk-
driving accidents. He once had been sued by the county welfare board for
failure to make support payments while he and Mrs. Whitehead were sepa-
rated. When the Whiteheads filed a petition for bankruptcy in 1983, they
4. For the New Jersey Supreme Court's statement of the facts see Baby M, I, 109 N.J. at 411-21,
537 A.2d at 1235-40. The trial court's fuller, and explicitly more judgmental, rendition of the facts
is set out at Baby M, I 217 N.J. Super at 335-55, 525 A.2d at 1138-48.
5. The trial court refers to the Stems as "Mr." and "Mrs." apparently in order to avoid the
confusion that would result from referring to them both as "Dr." See 217 N.J. Super. at 325, 525
A.2d at 1133.
6. Although multiple sclerosis is not currently viewed as subject to serious exacerbation by preg-
nancy, the trial court found the Stems' caution to be reasonable and understandable in light of the
medical knowledge existing at the time of their decision not to risk pregnancy. Id. at 337, 525 A.2d
at 1139.
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failed to disclose some of their assets to the court. The Whiteheads had de-
cided that they wanted no more children.
You get the idea.
After the Stems were discouraged from pursuing their efforts to adopt a
child because of the difficulty presented by their ages7 and different religious
faiths, they contacted the Infertility Center of New York to explore the possi-
bility of alternative reproductive technologies. The Infertility Center put
them in touch with Mrs. Whitehead, who had contacted the Center in re-
sponse to a newspaper advertisement seeking surrogate mothers. Eventually,
Mr. Stem and Mrs. Whitehead signed a written agreement pursuant to
which Mrs. Whitehead would be artificially inseminated with Mr. Stem's
sperm, would carry any child that was conceived to term,8 and after birth
would deliver the child to the Stems. Mrs. Whitehead also renounced all
parental rights to the child. In return, the Stems agreed to pay her $10,000
and to assume all of her medical and incidental expenses. In a separate con-
tract, Mr. Stem agreed to pay $7,500 to the Infertility Center.
Baby M was born on March 27, 1986, but after the birth Mrs. Whitehead
changed her mind and decided not to give up the child. The Whiteheads'
desire to keep Baby M was so strong that they defied a court order giving
temporary custody to the Stems, and absconded to Florida with the child.
When the Whiteheads were finally apprehended, the Stems initiated a per-
manent custody proceeding in a New Jersey family court. The court
awarded permanent custody to Mr. Stem, permitted Mrs. Stem to adopt
Baby M, and permanently terminated all of Mrs. Whitehead's parental
rights.9
Mrs. Whitehead appealed, and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted
direct certification. 10 The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the trial
court's award of custody to Mr. Stem, but reversed both the trial court's
termination of Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights and its order permitting
Mrs. Stem to adopt Baby M. It then remanded the case to a new trial judge
for a determination of appropriate visitation rights for Mrs. Whitehead.1
The New Jersey Supreme Court opinion discloses that, after the trial court's
ruling, Mrs. Whitehead separated from Mr. Whitehead, became pregnant by
another man, divorced Mr. Whitehead, and married the other man.12 After
7. Both Mr. and Mrs. Stem were forty-one years old at the time of the trial. Id. at 335, 525 A.2d
at 1138.
8. Mr. Stem reserved the right to compel an abortion if amniocentesis revealed evidence of a
genetic or congenital abnormality. Id. at 345, 525 A.2d at 1143.
9. Id. at 408-09, 525 A.2d at 1175-76; see infra note 33 (detailing New Jersey Supreme Court's
rendition of these events).
10. 107 N.J. 140, 526 A.2d 203 (1987).
11. Baby M, II, 109 N.J.at 463, 537 A.2d at 1261 (1987).
12. Id. at 461 n.18, 537 A.2d at 1260 n.18.
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reciting these additional facts, however, the court emphasized that they did
not affect its decision. 13 In reaching this disposition of the Baby M case, the
supreme court adopted the following line of reasoning:
Under New Jersey law, the natural parents of a child have equal claims to
custody of that child, and custody is to be determined with regard to the best
interests of the child.14 The record, containing the testimony of eleven expert
witnesses, required deference to the trial court's finding that the child's best
interests would be served by awarding custody to the Stems. Moreover, this
conclusion accorded with the supreme court's own independent reading of
the record. The stability of the Whitehead family was subject to doubt be-
cause of financial difficulties, Mr. Whitehead's persistent alcoholism, and
Mrs. Whitehead's tendency to be an overly-controlling mother, which the
court felt had jeopardized the psychological development of her children. '5
The Stems, on the other hand, had a happy marriage, a stable and financially
secure household, supportive friends, and a desire to nurture and protect the
child while at the same time encouraging the child's independence. The
Stems' lack of parental experience was offset by their willingness to learn,
their rational approach to problems, and their professional training. In addi-
tion, during the year and a half in which the Stems had custody of Baby M,
the child developed well and formed strong relationships with both Mr. and
Mrs. Stem. 16
Although the best interests of Baby M required awarding custody to the
Stems, the best-interests standard did not govern the termination of Mrs.
Whitehead's parental rights. Under New Jersey law, parental rights can be
terminated only after intentional abandonment, substantial neglect of paren-
tal duties, or a showing of unfitness.' 7 Mrs. Whitehead's conduct did not
satisfy this standard; therefore, her parental rights could not be termi-
nated. 18 Because Mrs. Whitehead retained her parental rights, Mrs. Stem
was precluded from adopting Baby M.19
The supreme court held that the surrogacy contract signed by Mr. Stem
and Mrs. Whitehead could not alter the foregoing conclusions because the
13. Id:
14. Id at 453, 537 A.2d at 1256.
15. Id: at 457-58, 537 A.2d at 1258-59.
16. Id. at 458-59, 537 A.2d at 1259.
17. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2-16,-17,-19; 9:2-13(d); 9:3-41 (West 1987), cited in Baby M, II, 109
N.J. at 425-26, 537 A.2d at 1242.
18. Baby M, II, 109 N.J. at 444-46, 537 A.2d at 1251-52. Mrs. Whitehead's contractual relin-
quishment of parental rights failed to constitute the requisite abandonment because, as is discussed
below, the contract itself was illegal, and because the relinquishment of parental rights in connec-
tion with private placement adoptions can be revoked within a reasonable time after birth, as it was
in this case. Id at 427-28, 537 A.2d at 1252.
19. Id. at 429, 537 A.2d at 1244.
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contract was illegal and unenforceable. 20 It violated New Jersey statutes
prohibiting private placement adoptions for money, and statutes prohibiting
the irrevocable relinquishment of parental rights in connection with private
placement adoptions prior to birth and counseling.21 In addition, the surro-
gacy contract violated New Jersey public policy in a variety of ways: it per-
mitted natural parents to determine child custody without regard to the best
interests of the child; it prevented a child from being brought up by both of
its natural parents; it enhanced the natural father's right to a child in deroga-
tion of the principle that natural parents should have equal rights with re-
spect to their children; it provided for the surrender of a child without prior
counseling; and it permitted the payment of money to influence an adoption
decision-all in violation of state policies expressed in New Jersey statutes
and judicial decisions.22
Finally, the supreme court held that no constitutional right possessed by
Mr. Stem compelled a contrary resolution of the case. Although the right of
privacy embodied in the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution,
and recognized by the state constitution, encompassed a fundamental right to
procreate,23 neither Mr. Stem nor Mrs. Whitehead was deprived of that
right; they were both permitted to procreate through Mr. Stem's artificial
insemination of Mrs. Whitehead. In addition, the right to procreate was held
not to encompass a correlative right to custody, care, companionship, or nur-
turing. If it did, the right could never be protected for one of the two sepa-
rated natural parents without simultaneously denying it to the other natural
parent. 24
Likewise, the court stated that its decision did not offend the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court recognized that New
Jersey law honors parental rights in an infertile man whose spouse procreates
through the process of artificial insemination (utilizing sperm provided by
another man) while refusing to honor parental rights in an infertile woman
whose spouse procreates through the process of artificial insemination (utiliz-
ing gestation services provided by another woman). However, the court
claimed that the difference between contributing sperm (a process taking
only a few moments) and contributing gestation services (a process taking
nine months) justifies such differential gender treatment, thereby defeating
any claim of an equal protection violation.25
Although the state supreme court declared surrogate-mothering contracts
20. Id. at 421-22, 537 A.2d at 1240.
21. Id. at 423-34, 537 A.2d at 1240-46.
22. Id. at 434-44, 537 A.2d at 1246-50.
23. Id. at 448, 537 A.2d at 1253.
24. Id. at 448-49, 537 A.2d at 1253-54.
25. Id. at 449-50, 537 A.2d at 1254-55.
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to be illegal and unenforceable under the facts of the Baby M case, the court
found that such agreements entered into by volunteer surrogate mothers
were not legally prohibited, provided they were not accompanied by any
monetary payment, and provided the surrogate mother retained the right to
change her mind, even after birth, about the relinquishment of parental
rights. In addition, the court stated that the legislature had the power to
modify the law and overrule the court's invalidation of surrogacy contracts,
subject only io constitutional constraints. 26
II. ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES
The New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in Baby M relies upon three
customary analytical techniques in order to demonstrate that its result fol-
lows from existing legal principles rather than from the subjective prefer-
ences of the judges themselves. The first is argument by assertion-a
technique by which the court announces a legal conclusion as an a priori
proposition that needs no further analytical justification. The second mode
of analysis is precedential-a technique by which the court justifies a conclu-
sion through a demonstration of its similarity to, or difference from, another
proposition that has already been authoritatively established. The third mode
of analysis is functional-a technique by which the court justifies a conclu-
sion through a demonstration that the conclusion logically follows from a
concept or functional objective that is already recognized to be desirable.
Ultimately, however, each technique depends for its validity upon the types
of policy preferences that our insistence upon principled decisionmaking is
designed to insulate from the process.
A. ASSERTION
Argument by assertion is effective when the asserted conclusion is self-
evident. Although assertions offer no analytical support for the conclusions
that they advance, the absence of analytical justification is unimportant as
long as the audience to whom the argument is addressed will accept the as-
sertion without further justification. In fact, because all analytical arguments
must develop from some starting point, assertions are an inevitable part of
syllogistic reasoning. If, however, an asserted conclusion is not self-evidently
correct, mere assertion does little, if anything, to enhance its acceptability.
27
26. Id at 469, 537 A.2d at 1264.
27. It is possible for an assertion to have persuasive impact because it is made by an authoritative
source. Einstein's assertion that E=mc2, for example, may be more persuasive than Spann's asser-
tion of the identical proposition, but this enhanced persuasiveness does not result from any addi-
tional analytical justification. Those who believe that Einstein's assertions about such matters are
self-evidently correct will accept the assertion without demanding any additional justification, but
those who decline to defer to Einstein's authority will still wish to see his proof.
[Vol. 76:17191724
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The difficulty with arguments by assertion is that they provide no assurance
that legal principles rather than policy preferences lie beneath the assertions
that are made.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's conclusion that awarding custody to the
Stems was in the best interests of Baby M is an example of an argument by
assertion. After reciting a series of facts about the Stems and the White-
heads, 28 the court then announced a series of conclusions about why custody
in the Stems was in the best interests of the child, without offering any justifi-
cation for its conclusions.29 Rather, it seemed simply to have assumed that
the Stems' financial stability, supportive friends, professional background,
and rational approach to problems were preferable to the Whitehead's finan-
cial instability, history of alcoholism and over-protective parenting.30 Many
would agree with the court, but some might not. In fact, some of our most
pervasive cultural myths extol the virtues of individuals who are able to use
initiative, persistence, and ingenuity to overcome poverty and adversity.
31
As a result of the court's decision, Baby M will be deprived of the opportu-
nity to develop the character traits potentially acquired through the process
of overcoming a less stable background. The opinion offers nothing to those
who do not share the court's preference for upper middle-class stability to
persuade them of its soundness. The take-it-or-leave-it nature of this portion
of the court's opinion makes it simply a reflection of judicial preferences
rather than a safeguard against them.
The Baby M opinion also illustrates how multiple assertions can be imbed-
ded in an argument in a way that makes them mutually reinforcing. For
example, one reason the supreme court awarded custody to the Stems was to
prevent disruption of the one-and-a-half years of bonding that had already
occurred between the Stems and Baby M. 32 But that bonding resulted solely
from the temporary and pendente lite custody orders issued by the trial
court. 33 In this context, an interim custody order is, in effect, a prediction
28. See Baby M, II, 109 N.J. at 411-21, 537 A.2d at 1235-40.
29. Id at 452-63, 537 A.2d at 1255-61.
30. Id..
31. Think about Abraham Lincoln or Andrew Carnegie or Sojourner Truth. In fact, family
stability and financial well-being may itself produce a dangerous despondency; consider the plight of
Richard Cory. See Richard Cory in SELECTED POEMS OF E.A. ROBINSON (M. Zabel ed. 1966).
One might respond that these myths really demonstrate that fundamental character traits rather
than socio-economic circumstances govern the fullness and gratification derived from life. But if
that is so, one wonders why the court was justified in focusing on socio-economic considerations at
all in making a "best interests" determination.
32. This justification amounts to an assertion because the court offers no analytical support for its
conclusion that the disruption of bonding would be undesirable, apparently believing the dangers of
such disruption to be self-evident.
33. The trial court initially ordered custody of Baby M to the Sterns, pendente lite, after an ex
parte consideration of their complaint seeking enforcement of the surrogacy contract. When the
process server attempted to enforce the order, the Whiteheads fled with the child to Florida, where
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about which party will ultimately prevail on the merits of the litigation.34
The court's interim and final "best interests" assertions thereby became mu-
tually reinforcing. The Stems were awarded permanent custody to prevent
disruption of the bonding that had formed as a result of the interim custody
awards, and the interim custody awards were based on the prediction that
the Stems ultimately would be awarded permanent custody. Because argu-
ments by assertion are offered without analytical justification, and therefore
are not subject to analytical constraints, the interim custody prophecy was
ultimately able to become a self-fulfilling one.
B. PRECEDENT
Precedential arguments are effective when a demonstrable similarity or dif-
ference exists between the issue currently confronting a court and an issue
that has already been resolved in an authoritative precedent. By demonstrat-
ing that the current issue is either distinguishable or indistinguishable from
the issue resolved in the precedent, the court can show whether or not the
legal principle embodied in the precedent governs resolution of the current
issue. Accordingly, under the doctrine of stare decisis, legal principles rather
than judicial policy preferences are said to account for the resolution of legal
issues.35 Yet precedent does nothing to ensure principled decisionmaking
when a precedent is held not to control resolution of the current issue.36
Additionally, and more seriously, precedential arguments offer no method
they were eventually discovered. The police in Florida enforced the court order, removed Baby M
from the Whiteheads' custody and placed the child with the Stems. The original ex parte order of
the court was then affirmed by the trial court after consideration of both parties' arguments. Baby
M, II, 109 N.J. at 416, 537 A.2d at 1237.
34. The customary standard for issuing such orders requires a court to balance the likelihood and
gravity of any injury that the court's actions will cause the respective parties, considering each
party's probability of prevailing on the merits. See Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (listing four factors court considers in balanc-
ing injury and likelihood of prevailing on the merits); American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prod.
Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986) (creating formula to balance likelihood of prevailing on
merits with gravity of injury). In Baby M the gravity of the injury threatening each party was very
similar, thereby canceling this factor out of the equation. As a result, the party most likely to obtain
interim custody was the party most likely to prevail ultimately on the merits.
35. For present purposes, the concept of precedent includes rules of decision emanating from
prior fact situations or from statutes purporting to govern specified fact situations. The distinctive
feature of a precedent is that it seeks to describe the cases it governs with a relatively high degree of
specificity, unlike a general concept or functional objective, which operates at a very low level of
specificity. See infra Part II-C (describing functional arguments).
36. For example, the trial court treated the body of New Jersey adoption law as a set of prece-
dents, but asserted that the adoption laws were inapplicable. Baby M, I, 217 N.J. Super. at 372-73,
390, 399, 525 A.2d at 1157-58, 1167, 1171. This left the court with broad discretion in deciding
whether to terminate Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights. The supreme court reversed this portion of
the trial court decision precisely because it thought the adoption precedents did control, and
thereby restricted the trial court's discretion to terminate parental rights. Baby M, II, 109 N.J. at
444-47, 537 A.2d at 1251-53.
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independent of policy preferences to ascertain whether the current issue and
the precedent in question are sufficiently similar for the precedent to be
deemed controlling.
An example of the New Jersey Supreme Court's use of precedential analy-
sis lies in its determination that the surrogacy contract entered into between
Mr. Stem and Mrs. Whitehead was illegal and unenforceable.37 As a major
justification for its conclusion, the court offered that the contract violated
New Jersey adoption statutes prohibiting the payment of money to secure a
private placement adoption. In the court's view, the contract amounted to
illegal baby selling.38 This justification is supportable only if the adoption
statutes in fact apply to the Baby M transaction and the surrogacy contract
in fact falls within the scope of the baby selling prohibition. However,
neither proposition can be established through recourse to the adoption
precedents alone. Ultimately, recourse must be made to judicial preferences
in order to give the precedents operative meaning.
1. Characterization as Adoption.
The appropriateness of the supreme court's characterization of the Baby M
transaction as an adoption is far from self-evident. This is illustrated by the
trial court's emphatic holding that the transaction did not constitute an
adoption within the meaning of the New Jersey adoption statutes.39 There
are both similarities and differences between surrogacy agreements and adop-
tions, but it is difficult to say whether the similarities or the differences
should control.
Both surrogacy and adoption involve the relinquishment of custody and
parental rights by a natural parent, and both involve a legal adoption by
someone who is not a natural parent. Because the relinquishment of parental
rights is at stake, the counseling and revocability concerns expressed in the
adoption statutes ought to be, at least to some extent, transferrable to surro-
gacy transactions. Likewise, because both significantly affect the future of
the child involved, the best interest concerns of the adoption precedents re-
main quite relevant to children conceived as a result of surrogacy agree-
ments.4° These similarities argue in favor of applying the New Jersey
adoption laws to surrogacy contracts.
However, there are also differences between adoption and surrogacy that
37. Baby M, II, 109 N.J. at 421-44, 537 A.2d at 1240-50.
38. Id. at 422, 537 A.2d at 1240.
39. Baby X, 1, 217 N.J. Super. at 372-73, 390, 399, 525 A.2d at 1157-58, 1167, 1171.
40. To the extent that these precedential arguments begin to look like the functional arguments
discussed in Part II-C below, that is because there is overlap between the modes of analysis I have
isolated. Indeed, my ultimate point is that, for analytical purposes, all three techniques are essen-
tially the same.
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argue in favor of treating the two as different types of transactions. Surro-
gacy contracts involve contractual expectations not present in the traditional
adoption context. Because a surrogate parent who relinquishes custody never
intended to have a child of his or her own, but only intended to assist another
couple in having children, our societal interests in protecting contractual au-
tonomy and private ordering may outweigh our interest in protecting the
surrogate's unanticipated biological attachment. Moreover, because disrup-
tion of one natural parent's biological attachment will ensue no matter which
way the court rules, societal interests in preserving contractual expectations
may ultimately govern the way in which the balance is to be struck. In addi-
tion, surrogacy could not have been within the contemplation of the legisla-
ture that enacted the adoption laws. As the trial court pointed out, the
novelty of surrogate mothering indicates that the legislature was not re-
sponding to the special problems posed by surrogacy contracts when it en-
acted the adoption laws. 41 Therefore, there is little reason to think that those
statutes, enacted to balance the competing interests implicated by a different
set of problems, also strike the proper balance between this set of competing
interests not considered by the legislature. Indeed, in its invitation for legis-
lative action directed specifically at surrogazy, the supreme court itself seems
to have recognized the great ambiguity surrounding its application of the
New Jersey adoption statutes to surrogacy contracts.
The problem of proper characterization is reminiscent of the frequent cate-
gorization problems that arise under Article II of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which applies to transactions in goods but not to services. 42 If surro-
gacy agreements are viewed as providing for the delivery of a child, as the
supreme court viewed them, 43 the application of adoption precedents may
seem appropriate. But if they are viewed as providing for the rendition of a
service, as the trial court apparently thought,44 the application of adoption
law seems more strained. In fact, surrogacy agreements are hybrid transac-
tions, and like hybrid transactions under the Uniform Commercial Code, are
apt to be characterized either way. Moreover, the characterizations are
likely to be inconsistent across jurisdictions and even within a given jurisdic-
41. Baby M, , 217 N.J. Super. at 372, 525 A.2d at 1157. The trial court is probably incorrect in
its assumption that surrogate mothering is a new reproductive technology; it has roots in antiquity.
See Areen, Baby M Reconsidered, 76 GEo. L.J. 1741, 1741 (1988). However, the trial court proba-
bly is correct that the legislature was not contemplating surrogate mothering when it enacted New
Jersey's adoption statutes.
42. U.C.C. §§ 2-102, 2-106 (1981).
43. Baby M, II, 109 N.J. at 422, 537 A.2d at 1240.
44. Cf Baby M I, 217 N.J. Super. at 372, 525 A.2d at 1157. The trial court describes Baby M as
a third-party beneficiary to the contract between Mr. Stem and Mrs. Whitehead. This characteriza-
tion indicates that the baby was not, in fact, the subject of the contract, but rather a third party to it.
Such an assumption implies that the subject of the contract was gestational services. Id. at 399, 525
A.2d at 1171.
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tion.45 Because characterization of surrogacy agreements is indeterminate,
adoption precedents cannot alone govern the outcome of surrogacy disputes.
A court must first determine whether the precedents apply, and it is unrealis-
tic to expect that such a determination could be made without recourse to
judicial preferences as an aid in resolving the ambiguity inherent in this ques-
tion. In fact, it is difficult to see how the ambiguity could be resolved in any
way other than through recourse to judicial preferences.
2. Scope of the Baby Selling Prohibition
After having decided that adoption laws govern surrogacy contracts, the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the contract between Mr. Stern and
Mrs. Whitehead constituted baby selling of the sort prohibited by the New
Jersey adoption statutes.46 New Jersey law prohibits the payment or accept-
ance of money in connection with a private placement adoption.47 Techni-
cally, the parties may not have violated this statute. The contract was signed
by Mr. Stern and Mrs. Whitehead, both natural parents of Baby M who
could therefore secure custody without an adoption. Although Mr. White-
head also signed the contract, his involvement was tangential, limited to re-
butting the presumption of paternity that would arise because of his marriage
to Mrs. Whitehead. Mrs. Stern, the adoptive mother, was not a party to the
contract. In addition, the contract provided that the $10,000 payment desig-
nated for Mrs. Whitehead was for the provision of her gestational services,
not for adoption. Apparently, the parties structured the transaction in this
way precisely because they wished to avoid the prohibitions of the baby sell-
ing statute.48 The supreme court had little difficulty deciding that, despite its
outward appearance, the contract was in essence a baby selling contract pro-
hibited by the New Jersey statute.49 But once again, the precise scope of the
baby selling statute is difficult to ascertain through application of legal princi-
ples isolated from policy preferences.
The statutory language offers little help in determining the proper scope of
its application, for the language broadly prohibits any payment "in connec-
tion" with a private placement adoption.50 Presumably, this includes direct
payments made to secure an adopted child, but does not include the taxi fare
45. The supreme court opinion discusses the differential legal status that has been accorded sur-
rogacy agreements in various jurisdictions. Baby M, 1I, 109 N.J. at 442-44 n. 11, 537 A.2d at 1250-
51 n.11.
46. Id. at 423-34, 537 A.2d at 1240-46.
47. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West 1987), quoted in Baby M, 11, 109 N.J. at 423 n.4, 537 A.2d
at 1240 n.4.
48. See Baby M, II 109 N.J. at 411-12, 423-24, 537 A.2d at 1235, 1241.
49. Id. 424-25, 537 A.2d at 1241.
50. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54, quoted in Baby M, I1 109 N.J. at 423 n.4, 537 A.2d at 1240
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paid to get home from the hospital with an adopted child. Accordingly, some
basis other than statutory language must be found for determining the scope
of the prohibition. The court chose to apply the prohibition to the Baby M
contract because it found the dangers entailed in baby selling to be present in
the Baby M transaction. Chief among these was the danger that financial
incentives would play a distorting role in shaping surrogacy arrangements:
economic considerations might cause surrogacy agencies to overlook poten-
tial problems with surrogacy arrangements in order to ensure that they re-
ceive their profits; women, induced by the desire to obtain monetary
payments, might decide to become surrogate mothers and to give up their
children even though the decision to do so was not truly voluntary; custody
of a surrogate mother's child might ultimately go to the highest bidder rather
than to the most suitable candidate for adoption; surrogacy might ultimately
end up being used for the benefit of the rich at the expense of the poor; and
psychological damage might be inflicted on a child who learns that he or she
was the offspring of someone who gave birth only to obtain money. 51 For
these reasons, the court chose to view surrogacy contracts as falling within
the scope of the baby selling prohibition.
The problem with the court's justification is that it assumes economic mo-
tivation to be a bad thing. In a capitalist society, this assumption is a difficult
one to maintain. Economic incentives are pervasive, and entities as reputable
as the United States government rely heavily on them.52 Moreover, many of
us would probably not go to work in the morning if it were not for the eco-
nomic incentive that gets us out of bed. It is untenable to suggest that a
decision is unreliable merely because it is economically motivated. There-
fore, if the court is to give this portion of its opinion any analytical appeal it
must demonstrate that the economic incentives involved in surrogacy ar-
rangements are qualitatively different from the incentives on which we rely
so heavily in our everyday lives. More particularly, the court would have to
distinguish impermissible surrogacy arrangements from permissible adoption
arrangements. This is difficult because, as the court itself recognizes, adop-
tion decisions are very likely to be motivated in part by economic considera-
tions;53 it is more expensive to raise a child than to relinquish parental rights.
Although recognizing this likelihood, the court does not appear to appreciate
the damage this recognition does to its own economic coercion argument.
51. Baby M, 1, 109 N.J. at 434-44, 537 A.2d at 1246-50. In this respect the court's precedential
analysis begins to look very much like functional analysis. See supra note 40 (precedential argu-
ments overlap with functional arguments).
52. Consider, for example, the elaborate maze of economic incentives that make up the Internal
Revenue Code.
53. Baby M, II, 109 N.J. at 438, 537 A.2d at 1248.
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Once again, only judicial preferences appear capable of distinguishing be-
tween permissible and impermissible forms of economic motivation.
C. FUNCTIONAL ARGUMENTS
Functional arguments are effective when a court is able to demonstrate
that a particular outcome is logically compelled by an abstract concept or
functional objective that has already secured general acceptance as being de-
sirable. For example, the impermissibility of newspaper censorship might be
established by showing that censorship offends the concept of free speech and
undermines the objective of promoting an uninhibited exchange of ideas-
things that are generally recognized to be desirable, as evidenced by the in-
clusion of a free speech guarantee in the Constitution. The difficulty with
functional arguments is that they proceed from propositions that are too gen-
eral to ensure that an outcome emanates from the principle being espoused
rather than from policy preferences.5 4
An example of the Baby M courts' use of the functional argument tech-
nique lies in its holding that the equal protection clause permits the court to
refuse enforcement of surrogate-mother contracts though permitting enforce-
ment of surrogate-father contracts.5 5 The Stems had argued that the trial
court's invalidation of surrogate-mother contracts amounted to unconstitu-
tional gender discrimination because infertile men but not infertile women
were permitted to contract for and adopt the children produced through a
process of artificial insemination in which their spouses participated. In re-
jecting this equal protection claim, the state supreme court stated that be-
cause the brief involvement of a sperm donor in the process of artificial
insemination was less significant than the nine-month involvement of a surro-
gate mother, differential treatment of the two was constitutionally
permissible.56
The different degree of involvement in the artificial insemination process
might, at first blush, appear to warrant differential gender treatment in the
enforceability of preconception decisions to relinquish parental rights. The
bonding that occurs between mother and child during the period of gestation
is not likely to be replicated in the father until some time after birth. In fact,
New Jersey law contains a strong presumption against granting custody of a
newborn child to the father instead of the mother, presumably because of this
54. It is this lack of specificity that distinguishes general concepts and functional objectives from
precedents. See supra note 35 (describing precedential analysis).
55. By surrogate father contracts, I mean contracts in which a male supplies sperm for the artifi-
cial insemination of a woman who desires to bear a child. The trial court noted that under New
Jersey law males are permitted to sell their sperm for this purpose. Baby M, I 271 N.J. Super. at
313, 388, 525 A.2d 1128, 1165 (1987).
56. Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 450, 537 A.2d at 1254-55.
1988] 1731
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
different rate of bonding.57 However, it is possible to view the court's differ-
ential gender treatment from another perspective that makes the equal pro-
tection problem seem more troubling.
The court's decision to enforce surrogate-father contracts but not surro-
gate mother contracts means that men who wish to sell their services as sur-
rogate parents are permitted to do so, but women who wish to do the same
thing are not. For a woman who is confident that she will not experience any
unanticipated bonding after birth, the court's refusal to enforce her surro-
gacy contract ceases to constitute benign paternalism. Rather, it amounts to
discriminatory judicial interference with her contractual autonomy that has
adverse economic consequences. 58 Certainly such women exist, and a woman
may know from past experience that she is one of them. Viewed from the
perspective of such a woman, the court's gender discrimination is difficult to
justify.59 In order to conduct a proper equal protection analysis, a court
would have to decide whether the bonding dimension or the economic di-
mension of surrogacy contracts should govern. The equal protection clause
requires that similar circumstances be accorded similar treatment, but it does
not specify the dimension along which similarities and differences are to be
judged. As a substantive matter, the concept of equality is devoid of content.
It requires additional input to acquire any operative meaning. 60 That input
must come from somewhere, and ultimately it can only be supplied by the
preferences of those judges who conduct the analysis. It cannot come from a
functional analysis of the concept of equality itself, because the concept does
not purport to supply the dimensions along which equality claims are to be
57. See id. at 462, 537 A.2d at 1261 (implying that mother's bond with child is stronger at birth
and early infancy than father's bond). The court's gender differentiation seems inconsistent with its
earlier assertion that New Jersey statutory law and public policy require natural parents to be given
equal rights with respect to their children, regardless of their marital status. See id. at 435-36, 537
A.2d at 1247. Indeed, one of the court's reasons for holding surrogate-mothering contracts illegal
was that they violated this policy of equality by making the natural father's claim to the child
superior to the claim of the natural mother. Id.
58. Such women will be unable to receive payment for gestational services while surrogate fa-
thers will be allowed to receive payment for their services.
59. The problem seemingly would be more acute for those who advocate market control of child
custody determinations, because judicial refusal to enforce surrogacy contracts would undermine
the ability of the market to produce proper outcomes. See generally Landes & Posner, The Econom-
ics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978) (discussing market control in adoption
context); Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U.L. REV. 59 (1987) (same).
60. This is the point made in Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
The Westen thesis generated spirited responses. See Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply
to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575, 576 (1983) (the equality concept is necessary morally,
analytically, and rhetorically); D'Amato, Is Equality A Totally Empty Idea?, 81 MICH. L. REV. 600,
603 (1983) (equality has a substantive content of its own); Greenwalt, How Empty is the Idea of
Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REy. 1167, 1169 (1983) (identifying both formal and substantive princi-
ples of equality). For Professor Westen's reply, see Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Sci-
ence, Math and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604, 663 (1983).
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evaluated. Nor can it come from precedents, because precedent, too, re-
quires additional input to acquire operative meaning.61 The only remaining
option is that the dimension is supplied by judicial assertion. But because
assertions offer nothing in the way of analytical justification, they necessarily
derive from the policy preferences of the judges who make them.
The argument through which the Baby M court concluded that Mr.
Stem's fourteenth amendment right of privacy did not encompass a right to
the custody and companionship of the child produced by his artificial insemi-
nation of Mrs. Whitehead provides another example of the assertion of policy
preferences through functional argumentation. 62 The supreme court con-
ceded the existence of a constitutional right of privacy encompassing a right
to procreate. However, the court emphasized that the right to procreate be-
came fully realized once a child was produced, and the right of privacy did
not encompass any additional right to the companionship of one's offspring
that required an award of custody to Mr. Stern. 63
This argument, however, does not explain how the court determined that
procreation was protected by the constitutional right of privacy but compan-
ionship was not. This admittedly abstract right appears to embrace a com-
plex of values relating to autonomy, personal intimacy, marriage,
intercourse, and family relationships." As such, it is unclear why procrea-
tion should fall within the scope of the right but companionship with off-
spring should not. In fact, it is easy to imagine an argument valuing
companionship more highly than procreation because without companion-
ship the right to procreate could become largely meaningless. Rather than
engage in any extended analysis of the concept of privacy, however, the court
simply announced its conclusion.65 In so doing, the court illustrated that
although functional analysis and assertion may be at different ends of the
analytical spectrum, they are, at bottom, very much alike.
Like an assertion, a functional argument seems incapable of achieving in-
dependence from the types of policy preferences it is designed to guard
against. By hypothesis, the governing concept from which a functional argu-
ment proceeds must be stated in terms sufficiently abstract to make it accept-
able to individuals whose views conflict about the proper resolution of
61. See supra Part I-B (describing precedential analysis).
62. Although the court awarded custody to Mr. Stem, it did so on best interest grounds rather
than on consitutional grounds. See Baby M II, 109 N.J. at 453, 537 A.2d at 1256.
63. Id at 448-51, 537 A.2d at 1253-54. While the court arguably recognized that a right to
companionship might be constitutionally protected, id at 450, 537 A.2d at 1255, it refrained from
investigating whether such a right did in fact exist or what effect it would have on the dispute.
64. See Baby M, I1 at 448, 537 A.2d at 1253-54 (listing constitutionally protected rights encom-
passed by the right of privacy).
65. For a detailed critique of the court's privacy analysis see Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy, and the
Baby M Case, 76 GEo. L.J. 1759 (1988).
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particular cases to which the concept will apply. As a result, the concept
cannot be stated with enough precision to control the outcome of those cases.
It is only by narrowing their scope that abstract concepts and functional
objectives can acquire the specificity needed to generate outcomes. But such
a narrowing succeeds only in transforming the abstract concepts and func-
tional objectives into precedents, which themselves can operate only through
recourse to assertions. Because assertions are nothing more than embodi-
ments of the very preferences that our efforts at principled analysis are
designed to'guard against, the prospects for judicial achievement of genuinely
principled results appear to be rather bleak.
III. THE CASSANDRA PROBLEM
In Greek mythology, Cassandra was the daughter of Priam and Hecuba,
the King and Queen of Troy. In an effort to seduce her, the god Apollo gave
Cassandra the gift of prophecy. But when she refused to submit to his
desires, Apollo transformed the gift into a curse by dooming her prophecies,
although true, to be disbelieved. During the Trojan War, when Cassandra
warned about the danger of admitting the Trojan horse into the city of Troy,
her warning went unheeded, and the city fell to the Greek invaders. After
the fall of Troy, Cassandra was violated, taken captive by the Greeks, and
given to Agamemnon, the Greek commander-in-chief, as his share of the
spoils. Cassandra ultimately was murdered with Agamemnon by Clytemnes-
tra, the unfaithful wife of Agamemnon and sister of the famous Helen. 66
The Greek myths have endured because their themes transcend time and
context. One transcendent theme of the Cassandra myth is that the truth of
an insight does not necessarily determine its power to persuade. Indeed, Cas-
sandra's plight depicts the existence of accurate insights which, because of
their nature and regardless of their truth, are incapable of being believed.
Such insights are fated to rejection even by those who would benefit most
from their acceptance.
Baby M is intriguing precisely because it teases us with a prophecy that is
incapable of belief. On a superficial level, the dissatisfaction that one is likely
to feel with the New Jersey Supreme Court's reasoning can be attributed to a
lack of analytical rigor. However, as the analysis offered in Part II was
designed to reveal, the defects in the opinion can also be understood as de-
fects inherent in the modes of argument that commonly characterize legal
analysis. As such, the analytical inadequacies of the opinion can be extrapo-
lated to all efforts at principled analysis, with inescapable nihilistic implica-
66. See T. BULFINCH, THE AGE OF FABLE 271, 273 (Mentor ed. 1962); H. ROSE, A HANDBOOK
OF GREEK MYTHOLOGY 143, 230-31, 243, 247 (Dutton ed. 1959).
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tions.67 Cassandra, however, suggests that we have no choice but to decline
the extrapolation because it would produce an insight of perpetual subjectiv-
ity that is simply incapable of belief. Nevertheless, one might still wonder
what causes such an insight to be beyond belief and what consequences
might flow from its necessary rejection.
A. CAUSES
The cause of Cassandra's curse was her refusal to sacrifice the virtue that
she valued most highly. The virtue of the legal system is its emphatic adher-
ence to principle, and like Cassandra, the system values its virtue above all
else. When that virtue is threatened by suggestions of inevitable subjectivity,
rather than submit, the system resists at all costs. Moreover, because its very
existence is at stake, the system's self-preservation instincts permeate even its
most unlikely facets.
The legal system has made a considerable investment in the viability of
principled decisionmaking. Not only is the possibility of adherence to princi-
ple a basic assumption of our judicial selection process, it is essential to the
customary justifications offered for vesting a significant amount of societal
power in a politically unaccountable judiciary.6 Moreover, those who par-
ticipate in the system most directly-the judges, the lawyers, and the repeat-
player clients-are accustomed to operating under a system of rules premised
upon the viability of principled decisionmaking. As a result, inertial forces
pose a formidable barrier to recognition of shortcomings serious enough to
necessitate major alterations in the operative rules of the system. If major
alterations were required, the current players would not only have to learn a
new set of rules, but they would risk a loss of power to less-established play-
ers for whom the new rules were not so awkward and not so counterintuitive.
The occasional-players and outside observers have a more abstract interest
in the viability of principle, but it is a substantial interest nevertheless. Be-
cause of their lack of familiarity with the system, they are likely to be con-
fronted with adverse or questionable rulings they do not fully understand.
This is especially true with respect to technical rulings that implicate esoteric
67. Baby Ms nihilistic implications can be seen by taking the present analysis one step further.
This analysis endeavored only to demonstrate that legal principles were incapable of insulating the
court's decision from judicial policy preferences and that the principles, in fact, depended upon such
preferences to acquire any operative meaning. If one were then to ask why the judges possessed
those particular policy preferences, the gravity of the problem would become apparent. Either there
is some explanation for the judge's preferences, which would amount to simply another principled
explanation whose inadequacy could also be demonstrated, or there is no explanation at all-a
thought that has distinct nihilistic overtones.
68. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1118-28 (1977) (comparing
methods of selecting judges and insulating selection from political pressure in both state and federal
systems).
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procedural or evidentiary doctrines. Among these players, tolerance for such
rulings is premised upon a generalized faith that any principle for which an
interest is to be sacrificed in seeming contravention of intuitive notions of
justice must be an important one that will be honored consistently across
cases. Moreover, any lingering dissonance between faith in the system's gen-
eral fairness and perceptions of unfairness in particular cases is resolved
through the conviction that while unjust results may constitute imperfections
in practice, they do not undermine the theory of principled decisionmaking
itself. Because there is no short term solution to the problem of perceived
unfairness, this leap of faith is required to dissipate the dissonance.
More subtly, the darker side of human nature relies upon principle as an
expedient in pursuing ends that would be intolerably threatening if pursued
directly. Freud hypothesized that dreams function to protect our sleep from
the rude awakening that would result if our baser sexual desires received
explicit recognition while our conscious defenses slumbered.69 Similarly,
principled explanation permits us to avoid confrontation with the baser moti-
vations that may lie beneath many of our societal actions.
On occasion, we permit a corporate or governmental entity to prevail on a
legal claim against a vulnerable human being even though the benefit to the
entity is marginal and the harm to the individual is devastating. Recourse to
a principle of commercial stability or a presumption of administrative regu-
larity permits us to avoid direct confrontation with more troubling questions
about income distribution and economic power that may lie beneath our de-
cision. On occasion we also decline to incarcerate obviously culpable
criminals because the police failed to engage in the proper linguistic recitals.
Recourse to an administrable principle of voluntariness permits us to avoid
direct confrontation with more troubling questions about free will and social
causation that may lie beneath our decision. On occasion we even tell wo-
men that they either can or cannot abort the fetuses that they carry. Re-
course to a principle of viability permits us to avoid direct confrontation with
the troubling thought that we could be making life-important decisions in a
largely arbitrary manner without any supportable justification. Even the
commentators, whose function it is to evaluate the acceptability of our legal
analyses, operate under institutional constraints that make it unacceptable
for them to question the fundamental soundness of a system of principled
analysis. Commentators earn their livelihoods and enhance their reputations
by maneuvering within the system, not by advocating its overthrow.70 More-
69. S. FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS § VII(d) (1900).
70. I take this to be the point of Dean Carrington's suggestion that critical legal scholars should
leave legal academics. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 1 LEGAL ED. 222, 227 (1984); see also
"Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL ED. 1, 1-26 (1984)
(comp. by P. Martin 1984) (responses to Dean Carrington's suggestion).
1736 [Vol. 76:1719
BABY M AND THE CASSANDRA PROBLEM
over, the analytical skills they have refined would be useless outside of a
system of principled analysis. If there were no longer such a system for the
commentators to refine, but instead only a universe of unconnected random
events, the commentators would soon become obsolete. Like the practition-
ers, commentators are unlikely to embrace epistemological perceptions that
would result in their own demise.
This is equally true for the maverick commentators who nominally do es-
pouse radical indeterminacy and prophecy the perpetual failure of princi-
ple.71 They simply cannot mean what they say. Their work relies on the
same analytical techniques that are used in the work of their more moderate
counterparts, and they typically share the same desire to enhance their es-
teem and to feed their families. Moreover, their assault on the possibility of
principle is paradoxically dependent upon the coherence of the very concept
that they challenge; Without a serviceable concept of principle, principled
demonstrations of incoherence could not hope to have much appeal.
The final reason that a suggestion of perpetual subjectivity is incapable of
belief is that it literally is incapable of belief. Most of our analytical activity
is directed at the question of which among a series of competing principles
we should ultimately permit to prevail in deciding a case. We give very little
thought to the notion that there is simply no principle whatsoever to consult.
Indeed, our belief in causal connections and syllogistic reasoning is so indeli-
ble that an unprincipled universe is quite unimaginable--only the science
fiction writers among us can even guess at what it would be like. Regardless
of the degree of power one is willing to attribute to the inertial forces of the
present system to maintain some version of the status quo, the overriding
reason that a prophecy of unprincipled jurisprudence cannot ultimately be
believed is that it cannot ultimately be conceived.
B. CONSEQUENCES
The consequence of rejecting Cassandra's prophecy was quite costly; it re-
sulted in the fall of the city of Troy. Without the benefit of hindsight, how-
ever, it is difficult to imagine the consequences of rejecting a prophecy of
perpetual subjectivity. Because we cannot imagine a universe that we have no
choice but to reject, we cannot hope to imagine the consequences of that
rejection. However, I have three suspicions that seem appropriate in this
regard. The first is that the inherent incredibility of an unprincipled system
of law breeds complacency. The second is that complacency breeds frustra-
tion. But my third suspicion is that our present inability to accept a prophecy
of perpetual subjectivity won't much matter-once the prophecy comes to be
believed.
71. See, ag., Spann, Baby M and the Cassandra Problem, 76 GEo. L.J. 1719 (1988).
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The theory of competition is that competitors provide an incentive to im-
prove quality and reduce prices. When there is no competition, these incen-
tives are absent, and complacency may cause products and services to be
worse than they would be in a competitive market. The inherent unac-
ceptability of any alternative to our current system of principled legal analy-
sis gives the current system monopoly power. As a result, there is less
incentive for the participants to make the system work as well as it is capable
of working: Even when it malfunctions badly, as some now argue it does, it
is still "the only game in town." Nevertheless, there is a paucity of demand
for dismantling the system. Even its harshest critics are willing to operate
within existing parameters, and would seemingly be satisfied with refine-
ments that included serious income redistribution and greater tolerance of
individual differences. 72 There is even less attention paid to the question of
what an alternative system might look like.73 The natural-monopoly status
of the current system poses the risk of complacency not only in the system
itself, but in its critics as well.
Because complacency reduces effectiveness, it also generates frustration.
Those who are so dissatisfied with the current system that they desire a ma-
jor overhaul are necessarily frustrated by the apparent lack of any viable
alternative. Their only options are to repress their concerns or to continue
their participation in a system that they may find more legitimating than
legitimate. Not even the most radical responses, such as revolution or anar-
chy, offer any hope of escaping the epistemological dilemma. Although Baby
M may have suggested that the prospects for judicial achievement of genu-
inely principled analyses are bleak, the prospects for abandonment of the
effort appear even more dismal.
My final suspicion is that none of this will matter very much once the
prophecy has come to be believed. I have invoked the myth of Cassandra to
suggest that some ideas can be so inherently incredible that they have no
hope of securing acceptance-we never even consider the possibility of their
truth in our evaluation of their acceptability. I have also suggested that the
impossibility of ever achieving principled legal analysis might constitute such
an idea. What I have not done is emphasized the ultimate fate of Cassan-
dra's own prophecy. Ultimately, of course, the prophecy came to be believed.
The initial rejection was costly, but the prophecy was ultimately proven to be
true. If the prophecy I have hypothesized turns out to be a true one, Cassan-
dra suggests that it too will ultimately come to be believed. And if that never
happens, it means nothing to assert that the prophecy is true.
72. Although the legal realist and critical legal studies movements may have some true nihilists
among its adherents, I suspect that they are few-and-far-between.
73. To the extent that the critical legal studies movement has been attentive to this issue, the
arguments tend to remain both syllogistic and familiar.
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CONCLUSION
The court's opinion in Baby M purports to be rooted in principle rather
than the policy preferences of the judges who decided the matter, but that
cannot actually be the case. The three analytical techniques on which the
court relies to insulate its decision from judicial preferences in fact depend
upon judicial preferences in order to acquire operative meaning. The tech-
nique of assertion amounts to nothing more than a reflection of preferences,
and as such, offers nothing to persuade those who are not already convinced.
The technique of precedential analysis purports to adhere to rules of decision
that have been authoritatively established in statutes or prior judicial deci-
sions, but the inquiries that must be made in order to determine whether a
precedent controls, once again, can be made only through recourse to prefer-
ences. The technique of functional analysis purports to derive outcomes logi-
cally from general concepts or functional objectives, but because those
concepts and functional objectives must necessarily be stated with too much
generality to actually govern particular cases, functional analysis too requires
recourse to preferences in order to function.
It is tempting to extrapolate the analytical inadequacies of the Baby M
decision to all forms of principled analysis, because the defects that appear in
the decision seem inherent in the techniques of principled analysis itself. But
such extrapolation would have nihilistic implications which, like a Cassandra
prophecy, are inherently incapable of belief. As a result, no matter how
skeptical we become about the promise of principled analysis, we are con-
signed to perpetual adherence to that model because of our inability even to
conceive of an alternative. Perhaps in time the dilemma will fade, but with
our present level of epistemological sophistication, it is hard to imagine a
way out.
In light of all this, it is difficult to know precisely what to conclude.
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